This paper tests the free cash flow hypothesis and analyzes the impact of the increased institutional ownership on firm characteristics. Institutional ownership of U.S. equities increases from 7.3% in 1980 to 45.7% in 2009. Greater institutional ownership reduces the agency problem of free cash flow. We find that the increased institutional ownership results in the lower leverage and payout that consequently lead to greater cash holdings and firm value. The results support the free cash flow hypothesis and provide an alternative explanation why firms hold so much cash and why debt and payout ratios decrease during the last 30 years.
The average cash-to-assets ratio for U.S. industrial firms doubles from 1980 to 2009. Classical agency theory predicts that corporate managers with substantial free cash flow are more likely to invest in negative net present value (NPV) projects even if paying out cash is better for shareholders (Jensen (1986) , Stulz (1990) ). Jensen (1986) suggests using debt and cash payout to control the agency problem associated with excess cash flow accessible to managers. These two mechanisms help prevent such firms from wasting resources on low-return projects. The passive monitoring has its costs: cash constraint and cost of raising external capital (Jensen and Meckling (1976) , Myers and Majluf (1984) ), overleverage (Campello (2006) ), agency costs associated with debt (Myers and Majluf (1984) ), and underinvestment (Myers (1977) ).
Meanwhile, the average institutional ownership of U.S. industrial firms increases almost seven times (from 7.3% in 1980 to 45.7% in 2009) . Prior literature suggests that the presence of institutional investors is associated with lower information asymmetry, better corporate governance, and lower agency costs (see Hartzell and Starks (2003) , Szewczyk, Tsetsekos, and Varma (1992) , Brous and Kini (1994) , Velury and Jenkins (2006) , O'Neill and Swisher (2003) ).
The dramatic change in ownership structure gives us an excellent opportunity to analyze its impact on controlling the agency problem associated with excess cash flow. The goal of this paper is to test the free cash flow hypothesis and investigate the impact of increased institutional holdings in corporate equities on cash balances and on two mechanisms that reduce agency costs of excess cash flow -leverage and payout (the sum of dividends and share repurchase).
The empirical evidence on free cash flow hypothesis is mixed. Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991) find support for free cash flow hypothesis by analyzing a sample of U.S. successful tender offers from 1980 to 1986. They report that bidder returns are significantly negatively related to cash flow for bidders with low Tobin's q but not for high Tobin's q bidders. However, Gregory (2005) uses UK takeovers of listed domestic companies during the period 1984 to 1992 and finds no support for free cash flow hypothesis. Griffin (1988) analyses the petroleum industry during the period 1979 to 1985 and finds support for the hybrid free cash flow model. Lehn and Poulsen (1991) analyze the source of stockholder gains in going private transactions. The authors find that the major source of the gains is the mitigation of agency problems associated with free cash flow. Lang and Litzenberger (1989) analyze dividend announcements and provide the support for the free cash flow hypothesis. In contrast, Howe, He, and Kao (1992) analyze tender offer share repurchase and specially designated dividend announcements and find no support for free cash flow theory. Richardson (2006) finds evidence that over-investment is concentrated in firms with the highest levels of free cash flow supporting free cash flow hypothesis.
A relatively small sample size is the common drawback of most of these studies. For example, Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991) have totally 101 observations in their sample; Griffin (1988) uses the panel data set for 25 firms; the sample size of Lehn and Poulsen (1989) is 236 observations; the sample in Gregory (2005) consists of 217 observations. Bathala, Moon, and Rao (1994) test their hypotheses using 516 observations. However, the sample of Richardson (2006) covers 58,053 firm-year observations. Our paper uses a much larger sample that consists of more than 140,000 observations. It spans over three decades and covers most of Compustat firms.
Another stream of literature focuses on the increasing cash balances of industrial firms. Recent literature documents that the increased cash holdings are in line with the rational behavior of a firm. Opler et al. (1999) find that firms with better growth prospects and riskier cash flow tend to hold more cash. Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) point out that the cash increase is due to the changes in firm characteristics. They find that the increasing risk in cash flow and the greater importance of research and development (R&D) expense relative to capital expenditure (CAPEX) requires firms to hold more cash. The literature suggests that if a firm cannot take a full advantage of the growth opportunities, it risks being predated and losing its market share.
For example, Chevalier (1995) investigates supermarket leveraged buyouts (LBOs). She finds that the prices decrease in the local market following an LBO if the rival firms are not highly leveraged while the prices rise if rival firms are also highly leveraged. Haushalter, Klasa, and Maxwell (2007) report that firms hold more cash and use more derivatives if they share a larger proportion of their growth opportunities with rivals.
Further, Faulkender and Wang (2006) find that additional cash is most highly valued by shareholders of firms with low levels of cash holdings; however, the value of additional cash diminishes in the level of cash holdings. Foley et al. (2007) argue that the tax costs associated with repatriations contribute to the magnitude of cash holdings. Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) find that cash holdings increase with stronger corporate governance.
We argue that concentrated institutional ownership, measured as the ownership controlled by five largest institutional investors, is an alternative monitoring mechanism for agency problem.
The results show that institutional monitoring has partially substituted debt and payout as the increase in institutional holdings leads to the lower debt and payout ratios. As institutions are good monitors, the decreased debt and payout result in greater cash balances rather than to investments in negative NPV projects. Further, cash reserves are positively affected by greater institutional holdings. In the analysis, we control for the predation risk and still find that the cash holdings are higher for firms with greater institutional ownership. At last, we show that greater cash balances enhance firm value. It is consistent with shareholder wealth maximization. The results are statistically and economically significant and robust for both high-tech and non hightech firms. This study provides empirical support for free cash flow hypothesis and helps explain the evolution of leverage, cash balances, and payout ratio during the last 30 years.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section I develops testable hypotheses. Section II describes the sample. Obtained results are detailed in Section III. Finally, Section IV concludes.
I. Hypotheses Development
We start from the free cash flow hypothesis. It assumes that managers want to invest all the available funds even in negative NPV projects. This conflict is not likely to be resolved by contracts based on cash flow and investment expenditure. The use of debt can decrease the free cash flow available to managers through repayment to debtholders (Jensen and Meckling (1976), Jensen (1986) ). Jensen (1986) suggests also using dividends. Similarly, by paying to shareholders, a firm's free cash flow decrease. Managers are less likely to invest in value destroying projects if they do not have sufficient funds. Alternative mechanism for controlling inefficient investment is through monitoring. We use ownership controlled by five largest institutional investors (Top5 holdings) as a proxy for monitoring.
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Empirical studies suggest that institutions are good monitors. Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998) use a private database consisting of the correspondence between TIAA-CREF and 45
firms it contacted about governance issues between 1992 and 1996, to analyze the process of private negotiation between financial institutions and the companies they attempt to influence.
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They find that at least 87% of the firms took actions. A survey conducted by McCahery, Starks, and Sautner (2010) found that the majority institutions that responded to their survey are willing to engage in shareholder activism. Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) use acquisition decisions to reveal monitoring and find that firms with concentrated holdings of independent long-term institutions are more likely to make withdrawal of bad bids. Hartzell and Starks (2003) find that firms with higher concentrated institutional holdings are associated with lower level of CEO compensation and higher pay-for-performance sensitivities.
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If monitoring by concentrated institutional investors can substitute higher leverage and higher payout ratio as controlling mechanism, then firms with higher Top5 holdings will have lower leverage and lower payout ratio. This leads to our first two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Higher ownership controlled by five largest institutional investors will be associated with lower leverage.
Hypothesis 2: Higher ownership controlled by five largest institutional investors will be associated with lower payout ratio.
The debt and payout policies are insufficient to discourage the managers not to engage into lowreturn projects. It is likely that firms still invest in negative NPV projects, but less than in absence of debt and payout. The monitoring and pressure by the institutional investors might discourage firm management to invest in negative NPV projects. Thus, we expect a positive relationship between institutional ownership and cash holdings:
Hypothesis 3: Higher ownership controlled by five largest institutional investors will be associated with higher cash holdings.
In presence of good monitoring, lower debt and payout ratios mechanically lead to greater cash 3 However, prior studies also show that institutional investors do not always have influence on a firm's corporate governance. Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling (1996) find no persuasive evidence that shareholder proposals increase firm value. However, it might be due to the actions behind the door before the initiation of shareholder proposal.
balances rather than to investment in negative NPV projects. Our next two hypotheses are as follows:
Hypothesis 4: There will be a negative relationship between cash holdings and leverage.
Hypothesis 5: There will be a negative relationship between cash holdings and payout ratio.
It is costly to use debt and payout to reduce agency costs of free cash flow. Both mechanisms reduce firm's financial flexibility. A firm must forego some good projects if they require quick response or the external financing is too costly for the firm (Myers and Majluf (1984) ). Firm value is hurt by insufficient internal funds. Besides, if a firm shares a large portion of investment opportunities with its rivals, it risks being predated and losing market share if it cannot make sufficient investment. Haushalter, Klasa, and Maxwell (2007) find inter-and intra-industry evidence that the extent of the interdependence of a firm's investment opportunities with rivals is positively associated with its use of derivatives and the size of its cash holdings. Campello (2006) shows that debt taking can both boost and hurt firm performance: moderate debt taking is associated with relative-to-rival sales gains; and high indebtedness leads to product market underperformance. Further, Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) show that good corporate governance improves the value of cash reserves and so enhances firm value. We would expect that a firm which adopts better monitoring is more likely to enhance its value by increasing its cash holdings:
Hypothesis 6: Cash holdings will be positively associated with firm value. 
II. Data
Our initial sample is drawn from Compustat. It covers the period 1980 through 2009. We eliminate financial firms (with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 6000-6999) since they have different capital structure and their cash balances might be subject to the regulatory authority. We also exclude public utility firms (with SIC codes 4900-4999) because they operate in regulated industries and their financing and capital structure decisions might be impacted by the changes in the regulatory environment. To be included in the sample, firms must have positive book value of assets (Compustat item AT), positive sales (Compustat item SALE), positive common shares outstanding (Compustat item CSHO), positive closing share price at the end of the fiscal year (Compustat item PRCC_F), and be incorporated in the United States. Fama and French (2001) report that the population of firms has changed over time. The proportion of small firms with low profitability but high growth opportunities has increased. It is likely that these firms are from high-tech sector. Thus, we control for industry (high-tech vs. non high-tech) in the analysis by including high-tech dummy in the models. Consistent with TechAmerica, we use 45 SIC codes to define the high-tech industry.
4 Table I presents the number of all firms, high-tech firms, and non high-tech firms in each year.
The last column reports the high-tech firms ratio (the number of high-tech firms over the number of all firms in each year). We find that the ratio of high tech firms increases from 14.7% to 24.9% during the sample period.
[Insert Table I here] dollars). This corresponds to 140.8% and 211.2% of GDP respectively (Gonnard, Kim, and Ynesta (2008) ). Thus, we can assume that the increase in institutional ownership is exogenous.
Nevertheless, for robustness, we still control for the possible endogeneity. Table II presents the evolution of cash balances over time. We use two measures of cash balances: book cash ratio (cash and short-term investments (Compustat item CHE) over book value of assets) and market cash ratio (cash and short-term investments over market value of assets). 5 To mitigate the impact of outliers and errors, we winsorize the values of both cash ratios at the tails of 0.5% and 99.5%. We find the substantial increase in cash holdings over time as illustrated in Table II . Market (book) cash ratio increases from 7.6% to 13.2% (from 10.6% to 22.6%) over the sample period. The median values are smaller but have similar dynamics. We also divide our sample into non high-tech firms and high-tech firms. The evolution of cash balances for both subsamples is similar.
[Insert Table II here] divided by market value of equity (common shares outstanding * closing share price at the end of the fiscal year). We find that this variable has a lot of outliers; thus, we winsorize it at the tails of 5% and 95%. The evolution of the payout ratio over the sample period is shown in Table IV . The mean (median) payout ratio decreases from 5.5% to 3.1% (from 2.3% to 0.1%) during the last 6 Debt is the sum of long-term debt (Compustat item DLTT) and debt in current liabilities (Compustat item DLC).
three decades. We find that the dynamic of payout ratio is impacted by non high-tech industries as the median payout ratio for high-tech firms is 0. This is consistent with the findings of Fama and French (2001) who report that firms have become less likely to pay dividends and the proportion of dividend payers decreases, due in part to the changing firm characteristics.
The descriptive statistics show the negative trend for debt and payout ratios; however, cash holdings tend to increase over the sample period. This provides the initial support for our hypotheses. However, we find that the ratios based on book value of assets and ratios based on market value of assets have different evolutions over time. One possible explanation is the decreasing book-to-market ratio (book value of assets divided by market value of assets). Table   IV reports the book-to-market ratio, winsorized at the tails of 1% and 99%, in each year. The mean (median) book-to-market ratio is 0.851 (0.895) in 1980 and decreases to 0.696 (0.683) in 2009. We also find that on average, high-tech firms have lower book-to-market ratio than non high-tech firms; however, the gap between the two ratios erodes over time. Thus, the decreasing book-to-market ratio is indeed one of the possible explanations for the differences between the ratios based on book value of assets and ratios based on market value of assets.
[Insert Table IV 
A. The Impact of Institutional Ownership on Leverage
To test whether there is a negative relationship between leverage and concentrated institutional ownership, we estimate the regressions similar to those used in Chang and Dasgupta (2009), Fama and French (2002) , Flannery and Rangan (2006) , and Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) . Specifically, our benchmark models are:
Market leverage Top5 holdings HT dummy Ln Assets B/M EBIT/Assets PPE/Assets R&D/Assets R&D dummy ;
Book leverage Top5 holdings HT dummy Ln Assets B/M EBIT/Assets PPE/Assets R&D/Assets R&D dummy ,
where HT dummy is equal to one if a firm is from the high-tech industries and zero otherwise.
Assets denotes book value of assets. B/M is book-to-market ratio. EBIT is earnings before interests and taxes (the sum of income before extraordinary items (Compustat item IB), interest and related expense (Compustat item XINT), and income taxes (Compustat item TXT)). PPE is net property, plant, and equipment (Compustat item PPENT). R&D is research and development expense (Compustat item XRD). R&D dummy is equal to one when R&D expense is unreported in Compustat and zero otherwise. To reduce the impact of outliers and potential errors in
Compustat, we winsorize variables EBIT/Assets and R&D/Assets at the tails of 1% and 99%.
Further, PPE/Assets is winsorized so that it is between zero and one. The models include year fixed effects. 7 The standard errors are corrected for clustering at the firm level. (1) and (2) [Insert Table V results that one of the reasons why leverage has decreased over the sample period is the substantial increase in institutional ownership.
B. The Impact of Institutional Ownership on Payout Ratio
In this section, we test the impact of concentrated institutional ownership on firms' payout ratio.
We estimate the model similar to one used in Fama and French (2001) 
Payout ratio Top5 holdings HT dummy Ln Assets B/M Assets growth EBIT/Assets Book leverage ,
where Assets growth is the annual growth rate of book value of assets. A variable Assets growth is winsorized so that it is not greater than 1. The model includes year fixed effects and standard errors are corrected for clustering at the firm level.
Model 1 of Table VI presents the results for Equation (3). We find that the impact of institutional ownership on payout ratio is negative and statistically significant supporting our Hypothesis 2.
The change in average payout ratio over the sample period is -0.024 (0.031 -0.055 = -0.024).
The coefficient estimate for Top5 holdings is approximately -0.06; therefore, the effect of the increase in Top5 holdings on average payout ratio is -0.01 (-0.06 * 0.166 = -0.01) and it accounts for almost 42% of the change in average payout ratio over the sample period. Thus, the results are economically significant. We find that payout ratio tends to be smaller for high-tech firms. It is consistent with Fama and French (2001) study which reports that small firms with low profitability and strong growth opportunities are less likely to pay dividends. Consistent with Fama and French (2001), we also find that larger, low-growth, and firms with greater book-tomarket ratio tend to have higher payout ratio. However, we find that profitability is negatively related to payout ratio and it is in contrast to Fama and French (2001) [Insert Table VI here]
C. The Determinants of Cash Holdings
To test Hypotheses 3 and 4, we estimate the regressions similar to those used in Opler et al. (1999) and Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) . Specifically, our benchmark models are: 
Debt issuance/Assets Equity issuance/Assets Acquisitions/Assets ; 
bt issuance/Assets Equity issuance/Assets Acquisitions/Assets ,
where NWC/Assets is the net working capital scaled by total assets (the difference between working capital (Compustat item WCAP) and cash and short-term investments divided by book value of assets). Industry sigma is the mean of the standard deviations of cash flow (operating income before depreciation (Compustat item OIBDP) -interest and related expense -income taxes) to book value of assets ratio over 10 years (if there are at least three observations) for firms in the same industry, as defined by the two-digit SIC code. FCF/Assets is free cash flow (operating income before depreciation -interest and related expense -income taxes -common stock dividends (Compustat item DVC)) to book value of assets ratio. CAPEX/Assets is capital expenditures (Compustat item CAPX) to book value of assets ratio. Dividend dummy is equal to one if common stock dividends are positive and zero otherwise. Debt issuance/Assets is the difference between long-term debt issuance (Compustat item DLTIS) and long-term debt reduction (Compustat item DLTR) divided by book value of assets. Equity issuance/Assets is the difference between sale of common and preferred stock (Compustat item SSTK) and purchase of common and preferred stock divided by book value of assets. Acquisitions/Assets is acquisitions (Compustat item AQC) divided by book value of assets. The variables FCF/Assets, CAPEX/Assets, Debt issuance/Assets, and Equity issuance/Assets are winsorized at the tails of 1% and 99%. NWC/Assets is winsorized so that it is greater than -1.
We include NWC/Assets into the models as it is entirely conceivable that one type of current assets (cash) substituted other types of current assets (net working capital). Industry sigma controls for cash flow risk. We expect that firms operating in the riskier industries hold more cash (see Opler et al. (1999) ). Further, we expect that cash holdings increase with FCF/Assets, Debt issuance/Assets, and Equity issuance/Assets; however, are negatively affected by greater Acquisitions/Assets and CAPEX/Assets. R&D/Assets is a proxy for growth opportunities. We expect that firms with better growth opportunities hold more cash. The models also include year fixed effects. The standard errors are corrected for clustering at the firm level. Table VII presents the results. Model 1 shows the coefficient estimates where the dependent variable is market cash ratio (Equation (4)) and Model 2's dependent variable is book cash ratio (Equation (5) [Insert Table VII here] We also find a negative and statistically significant relationship between cash balances and leverage. This supports our Hypothesis 4 as lower leverage implies greater cash holdings. We find that high-tech firms hold more cash on average. The sign and significance of other variables are similar to those documented in prior studies (see, for example, Opler et al. (1999) and Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) ).
Model 3 and Model 4 re-estimate Model 1 and Model 2 using Payout ratio as the additional independent variable. We document the negative relationship between cash holdings and payout ratio. The result is consistent across both models and supports our Hypothesis 5. Index is a measure of product market competition and is calculated using sales data of individual firms in the same industry, as defined by the four-digit SIC code. 10 Model 7 in Table VII shows the coefficient estimates for the regression. We find that institutional ownership and leverage are still significant determinants of cash holdings after controlling for Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.
However, in contrast to Haushalter, Klasa, and Maxwell (2007) , the results show that firms operating in more competitive industries hold more cash.
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To conclude, the results presented in Table VII 
D. The Impact on Firm Value
The results above support our first five hypotheses. However, it does not imply that we find support for free cash flow hypothesis. We argue that firms should rationally increase their cash holdings if agency problem of free cash flow is reduced. As the goal of firm management is to , where Sales i denotes sales of firm i in a particular industry. 11 As a robustness check, we also use Herfindahl-Hirschman Index calculated assuming that industry is defined by the two-digit SIC code. In this specification, we find that coefficient estimate for Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is positive but insignificant. We also re-estimate the models using Book cash ratio as the dependent variable. We find that the coefficient estimate for Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is negative and statistically significant, disregarding how we compute Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Results are available upon request. maximize shareholder value, this rational increase in cash holdings should eventually lead to greater firm value. In this section, we test this issue (Hypothesis 6).
We use Tobin's q as a proxy for firm value. Then we estimate the following model: 
where Q is Tobin's q (market value of assets divided by book value of assets) winsorized at tails of 1% and 99%. The selection of independent variables is based on the prior studies (see, for example, Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008), Kalcheva and Lins (2007) However, the effect of Top5 holdings on firm value is nonlinear. In the last column (Diff.) of [Insert Table IX here]
In summary, we show that the increased institutional ownership translates into the lower leverage and payout ratio that consequently lead to greater cash holdings and firm value. The results provide strong support for the free cash flow hypothesis and help explain the evolution of leverage, cash holdings, and payout ratio during the last 30 years.
E. Robustness Checks
We perform several robustness checks. 13 First of all, we re-estimate all models separately for high-tech and non high-tech firms as one might argue that these two sectors have evolved differently over the sample period. However, the results for both types of firms are similar to those previously reported and further support our hypotheses. We also repeat our empirical tests with industry fixed effects defined by two-digit SIC codes. All the results hold.
Then we re-estimate all models using total institutional ownership instead of Top5 holdings and get similar results. 13 The untabulated results are available upon request.
In all models, we use ln(Assets) as our firm size proxy. The sample spans over a 30-year period.
Thus, one might argue that our results are systematically biased as firm size tends to increase over time. We repeat all our tests using the percentile of book value of assets as a proxy for firm size. The results are essentially unchanged. Opler et al. (1999) and Haushalter, Klasa, and Maxwell (2007) run the regressions where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the sum of cash and short-term investments divided by book assets minus cash and short-term investments. Similarly, Harford, Mansi, and
Maxwell (2008) use the natural logarithm of cash-to-sales ratio as a proxy for cash holdings. For robustness, we repeat all the tests using the natural logarithm of book cash ratio and market cash ratio as the dependent variables and find similar results.
At last, to make sure that endogeneity is not affecting our results, we estimate three-stage least squares model. The dependent variables are book leverage, payout ratio, and book cash ratio.
The potential endogenous variables are book leverage and payout ratio. 14 The instrumental variable for book leverage is net property, plant, and equipment scaled by book value of assets.
The instrumental variable for payout ratio is assets growth. The results are similar to those reported in Tables V-VII except the coefficient estimate for Top5 holdings in Book cash ratio equation is significant only at 0.115 level (see Table X ). 15 Thus, the results support our Hypotheses 1-5.
14 It is also likely that Tobin's q (inverse Book-to-market ratio) might be endogenous. However, we do not include Tobin's q equation into the simultaneous equation model as all the exogenous control variables in the Tobin's q equation are also included in the other models. Thus, Tobin's q would be unidentified. 15 If we replace Top5 holdings with total institutional ownership, we get that the coefficient estimate for total [Insert Table X here]
IV. Conclusion
This paper tests the free cash flow hypothesis and documents the impact of the dramatic increase in institutional ownership on key firm characteristics. We argue that greater institutional ownership, measured as the ownership controlled by five largest institutional investors, reduces the agency problem of free cash flow. To test our hypothesis, we use a large data sample that spans over a 30-year time period.
The results reveal the channels of value creation. We find that the increased institutional ownership substitutes other mechanisms that reduce agency problem associated with excess cash flow. Thus, we observe the decrease in debt and payout ratios. Due to the effective monitoring of institutional investors, lower debt and payout ratios lead to greater cash holdings rather than to the value-destroying investments. At last, greater cash balances reduce underinvestment and predation risks and thus increase firm value. All our tests support these findings.
The results of this paper contribute to our better understanding of the role of institutional investors in monitoring firm managers and in the process of shareholder wealth maximization.
institutional ownership is significant at 0.001 level and consistent with our main results.
The presence of institutional investors enhances firm value directly and indirectly (via greater cash holdings and reduced underinvestment and predation risks).
The sample that spans over 30-year time period provides an excellent opportunity to investigate the long-term impact of the change in ownership structure and improved monitoring on key firm characteristics. Our paper contributes to three different strands of literature. First of all, our results show that one of the reasons for decreasing payout over time is increased institutional ownership. 16 Secondly, we show that the change in ownership structure is one of the reasons for decreasing leverage. Thirdly, we provide the alternative explanation for the increased cash holdings. 17 We argue that cash balances increase due to improved monitoring. This suggests that firms hold less than optimal cash in absence of effective monitoring by shareholders.
To conclude, this paper supports the free cash flow hypothesis. We find that the dramatic increase in institutional ownership (from 7.3% to 45.7%) during the period 1980 through 2009 positively affects cash holdings of U.S. firms; however, the impact of institutional ownership on leverage and payout ratio is negative. The results are robust to a number of alternative specifications. 16 The recent papers that concern this issue include DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2004), Fama and French (2001), and Grullon and Michaely (2002) . 17 Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009 ), Faulkender and Wang (2006 ), Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008 ), Haushalter, Klasa, and Maxwell (2007 , and Opler et al. (1999) investigate this issue. Higher ownership controlled by five largest institutional investors (Top5 holdings) will be associated with lower leverage. H2: Higher ownership controlled by five largest institutional investors will be associated with lower payout ratio. H3: Higher ownership controlled by five largest institutional investors will be associated with higher cash holdings. H4: There will be a negative relationship between cash holdings and leverage. H5: There will be a negative relationship between cash holdings and payout ratio. H6: Cash holdings will be positively associated with firm value. 
